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The decades-long struggle for control over oil and natural gas resources, infrastructure and
inﬂuence in the Caspian region has been referred to as the ‘New Great Game’, with Europe,
China, the US and Russia typically cited as the main combatants. We explore recent de-
velopments and aver that, if present trends continue, Europe will have access to Azer-
baijan's resources, China to those of the East Caspian states, the US will stay commercially
and strategically engaged, and Russia's inﬂuence will (continue to) diminish. How did this
unexpected turn of events arise? We examine China's dominance and argue that the
foreign policies of the US and Russia e within the region and even further abroad e have
inadvertently driven the East Caspian states and China towards each other. Wary of po-
tential maritime chokepoints in the Paciﬁc, China feels strongly compelled to shore up
resources and inﬂuence in the Caspian region. In part because of Russia's intransigence
regarding the Caspian Sea's status, the East Caspian states e faced with constrained access
to the West e have turned to China as an alternative market and counterbalance to Russia.
Copyright © 2015, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, new sources of oil
and gas in the Caspian basin were suddenly ‘accessible’ for
external powers. The ensuing decades-long struggle for
control over these hydrocarbon resources, transit routes,
and inﬂuence has been referred to as the ‘New Great Game’1
(Edwards, 2003; Smith, 1996; Swanstr€om, 2005). The initialsity.de (K. Smith
ir).
arch Center, Hanyang
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nter, Hanyang University. Prodcombatants were Russia and the United States (US), but over
the years, other actors, such as the European Union (EU) and
China, have entered the fray. China has quickly become the
leading trade partner for both Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan; and, recently, several observers claimed that
China is winning the struggle for inﬂuence against other
major powers (Boonstra & Laruelle, 2013; Gente, 2014;
Olcott, 2013; Standish, 2014). President Xi Jinping's visit to
the region in September 2013, in which energy agreements
worth over US$60 billion were signed, has even been
described as a ‘victory lap’ (Olcott, 2013: 1).
If present trends continue, it appears that the EUwill have
access to a smaller than hoped for portion of Azerbaijan's
resources, the US will be distracted but stay commercially
engaged, Russia's inﬂuence will continue to wane, while
Chinawill be the dominant energy power, particularly in the
East Caspian states. How did this unexpected turn of eventsuction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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gion and why have regional leaders either actively turned to
China or allowed it to gain dominance?
Our ﬁrst task is to address these questions. We posit that
the behaviours of Russia, the US, and the EU, both within the
region and, in the case of the US, further abroad, have inad-
vertently driven the Caspian states and China towards one
another. For example, the main thrust of Russian foreign
policy towards these former Soviet republics has been inte-
gration, or, as it seems to many in the Caspian region, re-
integration. Russia has attempted to both assert its domi-
nance and keep these states insulated from the interests and
inﬂuenceof othermajorpowers. TheCaspian states,however,
seek autonomy and have thus, for the most part, welcomed
China as a new investor and as a counterweight to Russia. The
EU and theUS have also pushed policies that have aggravated
regional leaders. Meanwhile, China is disturbed by the US
government's military presence and activities in the Paciﬁc.
With regards to energy, China is particularly worried about
US naval control over the Sea Lines of Communication2 in the
Strait of Malacca, through which China receives signiﬁcant
imports of both oil and natural gas. China thus seeks energy
resources it can transport over land e a need the Caspian
region neatly fulﬁls (Smith Stegen, 2015).
The great power politics of the region have captured the
attention of many scholars. We believe, however, that the
agency of the regional actors should not be ignored. These
states have been more than mere pawns on someone else's
chessboard. Thus, our second task is to examine the ‘multi-
vector’ strategies pursued by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Azerbaijan, as they navigate the manoeuvrings of the larger
states. Initially, these states attempted to appease and bal-
ance the larger states. However, we argue that the behaviour
of the Caspian states has changedduring the past decade and
that, with regards to energy, these states are no longer pur-
suing a multi-vector approach. Rather, the authoritarian
rulers of these states presently engage in strategies to (re-)
claim control over their energy assets and transit routes in
order to attain greater autonomy and maximize rents.
The article proceeds as follows: we ﬁrst provide an
introduction to the energy resources and infrastructure of
the three Caspian region energy producers, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, and then provide back-
ground information on the New Great Game and on the
multi-vector concept. We then present the general
approach and energy concerns of each major external actor
as well as the major events, agreements and milestones.
Next, we focus on the energy relations between each major
actor and each of the energy-producing Caspian states,
resulting in twelve mini case studies that capture the
contours of the relationships. We acknowledge that energy
is only one aspect of the complex web of relations between
and among these states. We mention security and other
non-energy matters when we believe they have had a
direct inﬂuence on energy relations. For the most part, we
approach our analysis from a ‘state-as-actor’ perspective;2 Sea Lines of Corresponding author. are key maritime passages that
facilitate large volumes of shipping trafﬁc and hosting the transportation
of key maritime trades such as crude oil.however, we also acknowledge that these states are not
unitary actors.3 We have thus included signiﬁcant coun-
tervailing voices, particularly when they seem to have
constrained greater cooperation and/or deeper energy re-
lations. We conclude by suggesting several ways of un-
derstanding the shift away frommulti-vectorism in energy
matters and what this change could mean for the future.
2. Background: Caspian resources and infrastructure
The Caspian region contains signiﬁcant oil and gas re-
serves and is one of the world's oldest production areas. As
our article focuses on Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and
Turkmenistan, we single out their data here. As indicated in
Table 1, by the end of 2013, the proven oil reserves of the
three countries, combined, were calculated at 5 billion
tonnes. Of the three countries, most of the oil reserves are
located in Kazakhstan (78.0%) and Azerbaijan (20.0%), with
Turkmenistan possessing far less (2.0%). The largest
amount of oil produced comes from onshore ﬁelds.
Offshore ﬁelds, however, hold the highest potential for
future production, but remain underdeveloped.
The gas deposits of these three countries are also sub-
stantial. Turkmenistan has the lion's share, with 17.5 trillion
cubic metres in reserves, more than 9% of the world's total
reserves. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have relatively far less
reserves, but sufﬁcient amounts to be important exporters,
particularly for, respectively, China and the EU. In sum, all
three producers hold 2.25% of world total proven oil re-
serves and 10.7% of world total proven gas reserves, as
Table 1 illustrates.
During the Soviet era (1922e1991), the region's pipeline
infrastructure was tailored to Soviet supply needs, with
major pipeline arteries feeding north to Russia. Exploration
and production in the Caspian basin was e and still is e
considered technically challenging and in the late 1980s the
Soviet Union brought in foreign expertise in the form of
Chevron, a US international oil company (IOC). When the
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the three Caspian states
assumed ownership of the reserves within their borders
and western IOCs, piqued by the prospect of new non-OPEC
supplies, ﬂocked to the region. Initially, the main geopo-
litical tensions existed between the US and Russia. Over the
next twenty years, however, Caspian resources have
attracted widespread attention from numerous states,
including the EU, India, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and
China. Thus, the Caspian region has not only become an
increasingly important source of global energy production,
but also a centre of overlapping economic and geopolitical
interests. Competition between states over resources led
observers to call the situation the New Great Game.
3. The struggle for the Caspian's resources: the New
Great Game
While it is undisputed that rivalry exists between major
powers over the Caspian's resources, scholars differ in their3 For an approach that examines the role of domestic actors in the
region, see Heinrich & Pleines, 2012.
Table 1
















Azerbaijan 1000 0.4% 0.9 0.5%
Kazakhstan 3900 1.8% 1.5 0.8%
Turkmenistan 100 less than
0.05%
17.5 9.4%
Total 5000 2.25% 19.9 10.7%
Source: BP, 2014: 6, 20.
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points obtain. First, many scholars view the rivalry as pri-
marily between ‘great power’ or ‘larger power’ states,
particularly, the US, Russia, and China. Some of these ac-
counts also include other large powers, such as the EU or
India (Atal, 2005; Kim & Indeo, 2013; Klare, 2004; Kurecic,
2010; Olcott, 2005; Swanstr€om, 2005; Weitz, 2008). A
second reading is that the region is not the site of one game,
but of several ‘Small Games’ played between the three great
powers (US, Russia, and China), and other powers, such as
the EU, India, Japan, and South Korea (Laruelle, Huchet,
Peyrouse, & Balci, 2010; Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2013). Other
scholars argue, however, that power dynamics in the Cas-
pian resemble neither a Great Game nor Small Games, but
rather a balance-of-power struggle twinned with the rising
might of regional actors. Great powers therefore cannot
impose their rules on the Caspian countries unilaterally e
not only can regional actors force the great powers to
compete with one another, but can limit outside inﬂuence
(Blank, 2012; Kubicek, 2013; Pradetto, 2012). Fourth, some
scholars argue that one should not restrict the powers in
the region to states, but should also include international
organizations and multinational corporations (Molchanov
& Yevdokimov, 2004).
Our take on the matter is that all of these views offer
useful insights. In the early years, the situation did
resemble a Great Game between the US and Russia. How-
ever, as new energy-hungry states, such as the EU and
China, became interested, the possibility of sub-games
between different constellations of players emerged. As
the commercial interests of non-state controlled com-
panies can be quite distinct from the strategic interests of
their home governments, we agree that the activities and
inﬂuence of some international companies should not be
overlooked. Last but not least, the newly formed Caspian
states have become strategic actors themselves. Although
these various perspectives differ with regard to the types
and number of players and games they consider, all
recognize the sharp competition and geopolitical
manoeuvring that takes place in the region. Moreover,
none assert that all actors are equally powerful or that all
interested parties will obtain their objectives. Some states
will be winners, and some states will be losers. Thus, which
states have had the power to attain greater access to re-
sources and where have they been able to gain inﬂuence?
On the heels of recent events, it appears that ‘China is
emerging as the big winner’ (Olcott, 2013: 1; see alsoBoonstra & Laruelle, 2013; Gente, 2014; Standish, 2014).
Although China was not one of the original ‘players’ in the
geopolitical tussling over Caspian resources, it has quickly
amassed numerous energy agreements worth tens of bil-
lions of dollars and has become the leading trade partner
for both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Smith Stegen,
2015). How did this outcome arise? We think the answer,
in large part, can be found in the behaviour of several of the
larger states and their interactions with the regional states.
In the case studies, we detail our argument as to how
different forces combined to produce the surprising ‘dark
horse winner’ outcome. First, however, we examine the
approaches and strategies of the Caspian states themselves.
4. The multi-vector approach
The behaviour of the Caspian statese vis-a-vis themajor
powers engaged in the region e has been described by
analysts as well as by regional leaders themselves as a
multi-vector approach. The termhas several connotations. It
has been used, for example, to convey the neutrality of the
Caspian states (particularly with regard to Turkmenistan:
Pomfret, 2008; Rinna, 2013). An implicit understanding of
many accounts of the multi-vector approach is that the
Caspian states, as they are surrounded by powerful neigh-
bours, pursue foreign policies that, among other objectives,
seek to avoid offending any of the larger states.
The term is also employed to describe how the Caspian
states ‘balance’ the interests of the various great states and,
even more speciﬁcally, use their relations with various
larger states to balance and counterbalance other large
states (Aslanli, 2010; _Ipek, 2007a; Overland & Torjesen,
2010; Pomfret, 2008; Shlapentokh, 2014a). For example,
Overland and Torjesen (2010) posit that Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan, to counterbalance Russia's dominant role in
the region, have purposely cultivated competing afﬁlia-
tions: both have developed energy relations with China,
and Kazakhstan has links with NATO for military coopera-
tion. Some scholars underscore how the multiple relations
dimension of the multi-vector approach helps the Caspian
states to avoid being dominated by one power (Aslanli,
2010; Makili-Aliyev, 2013; Shlapentokh, 2014a).
A more instrumental reading is that the multi-vector
approach is a way for the Caspian states to maximize
their manoeuvrability and bargaining power to pursue
their own interests (Bohr, 2010; Hanks, 2009; _Ipek, 2007a;
Kjaernet, 2010; Kubicek, 2013; Rinna, 2013). In his study of
Kazakhstan, Hanks (2009) notes that multi-vectorism has
provided the country with multiple options for dealing
with Russia, the US, and China, which has helped
Kazakhstan to achieve greater leverage with foreign in-
vestors in its energy sector. In a similar vein, _Ipek (2007a)
posits that the multi-vector approach has been used to
facilitate diversiﬁcation of oil and gas pipeline routes.
We believe that this latter interpretation e emphasizing
instrumentality and agency e of Caspian state behaviour
constitutes the most accurate description of the multi-
vector approach. With this article, however, we go one
step further. We aver that the Caspian states, with regard to
their energy relations, are no longer pursuing multi-vector
approaches. We argue that, during the past ﬁve-to-ten
4 ‘Glava MID Rossii “Karabakhskaya problema nie imeet otnoshenia k
evraziiskim economichescim problemam”’, 1News.Az, 18 June 2014, last
accessed 14 July 2014, http://www.1news.az/politics/
20140618022408810.html.
5 ‘Azeri-Russian arms trade $4 billion amid tension with Armenia’,
Bloomberg, 13 August 2013, last accessed 22 January 2015, http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-13/azeri-russian-arms-trade-4-
billion-amid-tension-with-armenia.
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about autonomy and gaining control over their energy as-
sets and transportation routes e and maximizing rents e
than about appeasing and balancing their more powerful
neighbours.
In the next sections, we present mini case studies of
each dyad, in which we touch upon the interests, activities
and behaviour of each actor.
5. Case studies: Russia
5.1. Russian behaviour and commercial engagement
Russia has strong geostrategic interests in the region,
regarding it as part of its historical sphere of inﬂuence.
Russia's overarching goals, vis-a-vis the Caspian states, are
to: (1) safeguard Russian territory from destabilizing fac-
tors potentially stemming from the region; (2) protect
Russian national populations in the region; (3) gain greater
control over the production and transport of energy from
regional producers to international markets; and (4) limit
the inﬂuence of external actors in the region, such as the US
and China (Bergsager, 2012; Marketos, 2009b). To accom-
plish these goals, Russia has employed a multi-pronged
approach, comprising the creation of cooperative eco-
nomic mechanisms and institutions alongside political and
economic pressure, such as price manipulation in oil and
gas deals (Gorenburg, 2011; Orttung & Overland, 2011).
Whether these goals will change in the near future remains
to be seen. Russia has recently announced its intention to
stop purchasing Central Asian gas (Rickleton, 2014); if this
occurs, then Russia's objectives in the region will likely
change.
Russia has created several organizations to facilitate
greater cooperation among the post-Soviet states. In 2000,
Russia created the Eurasian Economic Community (EurA-
sEC) to promote a single market. EurAsEC currently in-
cludes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Belarus. According to some experts, the purpose of the
EurAsEC was to develop a protective institutional frame-
work, which would provide security for domestic political
regimes and limit Chinese inﬂuence (Allison, 2008;
Berryman, 2010). As a next step, a Customs Union (CU)
between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstanwas established in
2010, which was transformed into a single economic space
called the Common Economic Space in 2012 to foster
further economic integration. In May 2014, this alliance
was reinforced by the creation of the Eurasian Economic
Union (EEU), which, by 2025, should become a single
market for the free movement of goods, services, capital
and labour (Kusznir, 2015a).
Russia sees the CU/EEU as a political project, whereas
Kazakhstan and other members view it as a way to further
their own economic interests, rather than as ‘any dream of
forming a super-state between Europe and Asia’ (Panin,
2014: 1). Some states in the post-Soviet space view the
EEU as an attempt by Russia to re-embody the Soviet Union
(Bordachev, 2015) and, in Kazakhstan, some perceived the
EEU ‘as a threat to Kazakhstan's national sovereignty’
(Satpaev, 2015: 1). On the initiative of Kazakhstan ofﬁcials,
a few important points were included in the operatingprinciples of the EEU, namely that the union should have an
economic character and not strive toward further political
integration. Moreover, the EEU should operate without
interference in the political systems of the EEU's member
states (Kusznir, 2015a; Satpaev, 2015).
Russia has also created the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), to which Kazakhstan belongs. Russia
is the main supplier of military equipment to Kazakhstan,
which proﬁts by receiving Russian weapons and defence
systems under favourable conditions. Both countries also
cooperate through more than 60 bilateral agreements
covering defence and military-technical cooperation (Wilk,
2014), and have recently decided to build a join regional air
defence system (Rousseau, 2011). Moreover, Russian and
Kazakhstan both participate in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Whereas the Kazakhstan government
has been receptive to Russia's institution building, the
governments of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have not.
Azerbaijani politicians have repeatedly declared that
Azerbaijan will not join economic and military organiza-
tions led by Russia, because of Armenia's respective
membership or observer-status in these organizations. So
long as the conﬂict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over
Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved, closer institutional
cooperation between Moscow and Baku seems unlikely.4
Moscow, however, keeps the pressure on Azerbaijan.
Since the establishment of the EEU in May 2014, high-
ranking Russian ofﬁcials have periodically visited Baku in
order to persuade Azerbaijan to join the union (Abbasov,
2014; Valiyev, 2014). Despite tensions over Russia's close
relationship with Armenia, Russia sells weaponry to
Azerbaijan totalling US$4 billion in 2013.5
Turkmenistan has steadfastly refused to join organiza-
tions and institutions, regardless of whether they are
initiated by China, Russia, or any other country. In 1995,
Turkmenistan requested and was granted formal UN
recognition of its policy of permanent neutrality and,
neutrality appears in the country's constitution (Anceschi,
2008: 25).5.2. Energy relations
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian
countries were wholly dependent on Russian transport
systems, endowing Russia with control over all their ex-
ports. In the 1990s, Russia tried to prolong this dependence
by discouraging pipelines that would bypass Russian ter-
ritory and encouraging the development of new pipelines
e traversing Russia e to transport the region's increased
output to western markets. Russia also sought to become
more active in upstream activities in the Caspian region;
but, unlike western companies, Russian companies could
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development of the region's ﬁelds, many of which are
geologically difﬁcult. Russia was also burdened with
problems in its internal energy market that emerged after
the dissolution of Soviet structures. Thus, Russia was con-
strained in its capacity to play a major role in the Caspian
region.
When Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, the situ-
ation changed. Putin focused on upgrading Russia's energy
expertise, reclaiming domestic energy assets ‘lost’ during
the privatization frenzy of the 1990s, and asserting greater
control over former Soviet assets abroad. Moreover, as
Balmaceda (2013: 77) notes, ‘by the early 2000s CA [Central
Asian, the authors] gas had become essential for Gazprom
to make up the difference between its domestic production
and its total commitments (domestic demand and export
contracts to CIS and west European markets). Yet these
increased imports from CA were also the result of a busi-
ness decision: that it would be more advantageous to
import gas from CA for re-export to the west European
markets than to engage in the large-scale development of
expensive new ﬁelds.’ In this context, Putin frequently
visited the Caspian states to negotiate energy agreements.
In the following, we review Russia's Putin-era activities in
and behaviour towards these countries.
5.2.1. Russian-Azerbaijan energy relations
Russia's behaviour towards Azerbaijan has been a mix of
friendliness and manipulation. The relationship's rockiness
can be primarily attributed to (1) Russia's support for
Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, and (2) Azerbai-
jan's growing energy cooperation with the US and the EU
(Agayev, 2014; Valiyev, 2010). Indeed, some analysts make
a direct link between Russia's displeasure with Azerbaijan's
emerging position as a gas supplier to Europe and Russia's
sometimes less-than-helpful disposition towards the
Nagorno-Karabakh situation (cf., Shlapentokh, 2014b). As a
result of these and other tensions, bilateral relations in the
1990s ‘were negative, if not hostile’ (Makili-Aliyev, 2013: 4).
The most powerful example of Azerbaijan's desire to
export oil independent of the Russian transit system was
the construction of the US-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) oil pipeline in the 1990s. The pipeline was a blow to
Russia, which had vehemently opposed it (Smith Stegen,
2011). Because of US lobbying for the pipeline, it has been
referred to as ‘America's most important Eurasian strategic
initiative since the Soviet collapse’ (Bremmer, 2003).
Until 2007, Azerbaijan imported Russian gas. However,
with the start of gas production from the Shah Deniz ﬁeld,
Azerbaijan became a gas exporter. Initially, Russia imported
about half a billion cubic metres per year (bcm/y) of Azer-
baijani gas. During Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Azerbaijan
in 2010, the two sides agreed to increase the annual volume
of gas imported by Russia to 4 bcm/y.6 Some believe Russia
achieved this deal by exerting extraordinary means of
pressure. As one analyst observed: ‘President Medvedev's
visit to Azerbaijan was preceded by deliberate incitement6 ‘Russia buys up Azeri Gas’, Voice of Russia, 3 September 2010, last
accessed 14 July 2014, http://voiceofrussia.com/2010/09/03/18643882/.of the Lezgin and Avar ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan by
Moscow to induce Azerbaijan to accept Russia's gas pro-
posals' (Blank, 2013: 44e45).
Of the three Caspian states, Russia and Azerbaijan have
the most complicated security relationship and it seems to
have an inﬂuence on their energy relations. Azerbaijan is
part of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and
has refused to join Russia's security organization, the CSTO.
Concomitantly, Russia has been closely aligned with
Armenia and has played a questionable role in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict (cf., Smith Stegen, 2011). To
diversify away from Russia, Azerbaijan has developed en-
ergy relations with Europe and Turkey, and has also been
discussing cooperation with Iran (Khatinoglu, 2014).
5.2.2. Russian-Kazakh energy relations
As in Soviet times, a large proportion of Kazakh oil ex-
ports runs through Russian territory. Kazakhstan also ex-
ports natural gas and serves as a transit country for natural
gas exports from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to Russia
via the Central Asia-Centre gas pipeline (CAC), which was
constructed during Soviet times and is controlled by Gaz-
prom, Russia's largest natural gas entity. The two countries
also cooperate in the downstream sector: Russia supplies
Kazakh reﬁneries with crude oil and a signiﬁcant amount of
oil products. In addition, Russian companies are involved in
the exploration of several onshore oil and gas ﬁelds. For
example, the Russian oil company, Lukoil, has a 10% share of
Kazakhstan's total crude oil production.7
The various activities may seem to constitute a deep
energy relationship; however, Russia's engagement in the
Kazakh energy sector is limited. The current Russian oil
pipeline infrastructure cannot offer additional capacity to
carry rising Kazakh oil production. Moreover, the CAC gas
system needs to be modernized and expanded before it can
accommodate more exports from Kazakhstan. Although
the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
reached an agreement to reconstruct and expand the CAC
pipeline in May 2007, concrete steps have been hindered
(as these problems relate to Turkmenistan, they will be
discussed in the following section). Russia is also con-
strained with regards to offshore exploration: it cannot
offer the technology, investment packages, or loans that
will be required to develop Kazakhstan's offshore potential.
For its part, Kazakhstan has shown continual interest in
the construction of oil and gas pipelines avoiding Russian
territory, and pipelines to China have provided an attractive
alternative. Kazakhstan has also developed transportation
infrastructure with Azerbaijan, such as the Trans-Caspian
Oil Transport System, and has expanded port capacities in
Georgia to bring Kazakh oil to European markets through
tankers. In this way, Kazakhstan not only reduces its
dependence on Russian pipeline infrastructure, but also
strengthens its relationships with Azerbaijan and Georgia
and builds an energy network between Central Asia and the
Caucasus. Kazakhstan has also been receptive to foreign
upstream investment and has attracted the more7 Cf., Lukoil-Overseas Projects website, last accessed 14 July 2014,
http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/61.php.
9 ‘China's imports of Turkmen gas since 2009 totals 30 Bcm: CNPC0 ,
Platts, 4 June 2012, last accessed 14 July 2014, http://www.platts.com/
latest-news/natural-gas/singapore/chinas-imports-of-turkmen-gas-
since-2009-totals-7686814; ‘Ashgabat, Beijing sign deals to expand
Turkmen gas exports to China’, Platts, 4 September 2013, last accessed 14
July 2014, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/moscow/
ashgabat-beijing-sign-deals-to-expand-turkmen-27370637.
10 ‘Turkmenistan: Gas blast ignites Turkmen-Russian row’, EurasiaNet, 9
April 2009, last accessed 14 July 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/
departments/insightb/articles/eav041009b.shtml.
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difﬁcult offshore resources. These various activities have
had an impact on Russian-Kazakhstan trade volumes:
whereas trade between the EU and Kazakhstan has been
steadily rising, trade between Russia and Kazakhstan has
dropped to about half of its previous volumes (Norling,
2014).
5.2.3. Russian-Turkmenistan energy relations
The Russian-Turkmenistan energy relationship is com-
plex. Russia has used natural gas imports from
Turkmenistan to buttress its own supplies and, when
Russian production has been insufﬁcient, it has re-sold
Turkmen gas to European customers. In the 1990s, Russia
paid for Turkmen gas primarily with barter trade, which
was not an entirely satisfactory arrangement for
Turkmenistan. As Turkmen gas exports increased e via the
CAC pipelinee Russia became concerned and consequently
implemented export quotas and interrupted deliveries of
Turkmen gas (Vasanczki, 2011). For Turkmenistan's highly
dependent economy, the reduction in exports had devas-
tating consequences. In 1999, Russia and Turkmenistan
reached a new agreement, with Russia agreeing to pay 40%
of its gas payments in cash (US$36.70 per 1000 cm) and the
remainder in barter trade (Barkanov, 2014: 165).
In 2003, Gazprom signed a 25-year agreement to in-
crease Turkmen gas imports from 5 to 6 bcm/y in 2004 to
70e80 bcm/y in 2028. However, Russia never took more
than 45 bcm/y under this agreement, partly because of
limitations posed by the poor condition of the CAC pipeline.
As mentioned earlier, in 2007 Russia, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan agreed to upgrade the CAC pipeline; they
also agreed to construct a new Caspian gas (Prikaspiysky)
pipeline. However, neither the CAC's upgrade nor the new
pipeline was realized because of disagreements between
Russia and Turkmenistan over the new pipeline's direction.
Turkmenistan hoped it would connect its large Yolotan
ﬁeld to domestic ports at the Caspian Sea, allowing delivery
of Turkmen gas to international markets. Russia, in turn,
agreed to invest only if Turkmenistan connected the pipe-
line to the existing CAC, re-routing Turkmen gas to Russia
instead of to the Caspian ports. The Turkmen government
rejected this proposition and is building a new East-West
gas the pipeline on its own (Socor, 2009). The pipeline
will transport gas from gas ﬁelds in eastern Turkmenistan
to the coast of the Caspian Sea.8
A second reason for Russia's failure to buy more Turk-
men gas has been frequent disagreements over price. In the
mid-2000s, Turkmenistan sought a price increase in
response to price developments in Europe, which Russia
was not willing to pay. However, the negotiating dynamics
between Russia and Turkmenistan changed when China
became a customer for Turkmen gas.
Like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan has been seeking non-
Russian transit routes, partly to reduce reliance on Russia,
and partly because Turkmenistan has been experiencing8 ‘Turkmenistan zavershayet stroitelstvo exportnogo gazoprovoda
Vostok-Zapad’, Neftegaz.ru, 21 March 2014, last accessed 14 July 2014,
http://neftegaz.ru/news/view/124358%29.technical and ﬁnancial difﬁculties and needs assistance
beyond Russia (Bochkarov, 2013; Crude Accountability,
2009; US Energy Information Agency, 2012). And, like
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan has found distinct beneﬁts to
partnering with China. In 2007, China and Turkmenistan
agreed to construct the Central AsiaeChina gas pipeline. In
2009, gas began ﬂowing from Turkmenistan to China and,
by 2012, China was importing more than half of Turkme-
nistan's total gas exports.9 Turkmenistan also supplies
pipeline gas to Iran, but the quantities exported were too
small to challenge Russia's position. However, China's entry
as a customer signiﬁcantly weakened Russia's dominance
in the Turkmen energy sector. Additional threats to Russian
inﬂuence include the growing interest of western countries
in Turkmenistan's gas resources and Turkmenistan's in-
terest in liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG). It already has one LNG
terminal and in 2012 announced plans to increase its ca-
pacity (see Jackson, 2012).
With the leverage it gained from having new customers,
in 2009 Turkmenistan was able to pressure Russia to pay
European prices for Turkmenistan's gas (Barkanov, 2014;
Overland, 2009). Gazprom soon regretted this decision.
The global economic crises and falling gas consumption in
Europe lowered demand for Russian gas imports: ‘Gazprom
found itself in the uncomfortable position of buying Turk-
men gas [… ] at prices that exceeded those it received from
European consumers. Some observers speculated that the
agreement to pay “European price” was a “mistake”’
(Barkanov, 2014: 165e166). New negotiations between
Russia and Turkmenistan over gas prices and import vol-
umes were ‘interrupted’ and Russian imports were halted
after an explosion on the Russian portion of the CAC gas
pipeline in April 2009, causing signiﬁcant revenue losses
for Turkmenistan. Because the blast occurred when Russia
was seeking to reduce its imports of Turkmen gas, the
Turkmenistan government was suspicious.10 Ten months
later, the gas dispute was resolved and reports indicate that
Gazprom agreed to purchase up to 30 bcm/y of Turkmen
gas at European price levels (Barkanov, 2014),11 but has
hitherto never taken more than 10 bcm/y.12
As the Russian-Turkmenistan disagreement over the
routing of the proposed Prikaspiysky pipeline demon-
strated, Russia seeks to defend its strong market position in
Europe and constrain the Caspian states from accessing
those markets. For this same reason, Russia has steadfastly11 ‘Ob itogakh vizita delegatsii OAO ‘Gazprom’ v Turkmenistan’, Gaz-
prom, 22 December 2009, last accessed 14 July 2014, http://www.
gazprom.ru/press/news/2009/december/article73466/.
12 ‘China secures larger Turkmen gas supplies’, Reuters, 3 September
2013, last accessed 21 July 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/
03/gas-turkmenistan-china-idUKL6N0GZ31W20130903.
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Caspian Pipeline (TCP), which would cross the Caspian
Sea and allow the East Caspian states to more easily access
western markets. The US originally proposed the TCP in
1996 as an alternative to Russian pipelines and was sup-
ported by several countries. At the OSCE Istanbul summit in
November 1999, Turkmenistan's President and his Azer-
baijani, Georgian, and Turkish counterparts signed a letter
of intent to build the TGCP.13 Around this same time,
Turkmenistan and Russia had been negotiating over new
payment arrangements. When Russia agreed to pay 40% of
its payment in cash, Turkmenistan dropped its support for
the TCP and the project stalled.
The 2007e2008 launching of the EU Southern Gas
Corridor, a plan to develop new supply routes and infra-
structure to import gas from the Caspian and Middle East
regions,14 has reawakened EU interest in the TCP. In 2011,
the EUmember statesmandated the European Commission
(EC) to secure a binding agreement for the TCP. Russia,
however, has not become more receptive and now argues,
among other reasons, that construction of the pipeline
could endanger the Caspian Sea's sensitive ecosystem.
Moreover, Russia has emphasized, as before, that any con-
struction agreement would require the approval of all ﬁve
Caspian littoral states. Further complicating matters,
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan disagree over offshore
boundary demarcations. The TCP thus faces technical, legal
and ﬁnancial problems, all of which serve Russia's interests
in thwarting the project (Blagov, 2014).15 In 2014,
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Turkey began engaging in a
series of trilateral talks to discuss the Southern Gas
Corridor. Reportedly, all options are on the table, and the
advantages and disadvantages of each are under discussion.
The EU does not appear to be a party to these talks. The
general impression gained from the trilateral talks is that
the joint Azerbaijan-Turkish Trans Anatolian Natural Gas
Pipeline (TANAP) project (discussed below) is taking pre-
cedence over any future TCP. On one hand, this makes
sense, as TANAP is a concrete agreement and TCP must still
overcome myriad obstacles. However, it is noteworthy that
the EU does not seem to be involved, at least not on a
formal basis, in discussions that could affect the fate of yet
another EU-backed pipeline.6. Case studies: EU
6.1. European Union behaviour and commercial engagement
Beyond EU technical assistance programmes, in the
1990s there was very little intergovernmental activity
pertaining to energy between the EU and the Caspian13 ‘Transcaspian gas pipeline accord signed’, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, 19 November 1999, last accessed 14 July 2014, http://www.hri.
org/news/balkans/rferl/1999/99-11-19.rferl.html#13.
14 ‘The EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan’, Europe.eu, 4
March 2009, last accessed 15 July 2014, http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/energy/european_energy_policy/en0003_en.htm.
15 ‘Russia says pipelines across Caspian Sea ﬂoor unacceptable’, RIA
Novosti, 25 January 2007, last accessed 14 July 2014, http://en.ria.ru/
russia/20070125/59687576.html.states. This changed, however, in the late-2000s: First,
European gas demand rose; and, second, several EU
member states experienced gas disruptions during the
various Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes. Because of inten-
siﬁed concern over energy security, EU ofﬁcials developed
the EU Security and Solidarity Action Plan, which included
supporting the Southern Gas Corridor, a plan to develop
new supply routes and infrastructure to import gas from
the Caspian and Middle East regions.16 The EU has also
attempted to formalize relations with these states through
a series of measures, ranging from Partnership and Coop-
eration Agreements (PCAs) to Memorandum of Un-
derstandings (MoUs) to Association Agreements (part of
the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative).
Despite its interest in Caspian resources, the EU has had
great difﬁculty in forging a uniﬁed approach in its relations
with the Caspian states. The EU contains a multitude of
divergent interests; for example, those of the European
Commission, single member states, international com-
panies, and NGOs. A main point of contention is the human
rights situation in the Caspian region. The NGOs push
Brussels to take a harder line on human rights (cf. e.g.,
Kourmanova, 2014). In 2008, the EU and the Central Asian
states agreed to hold annual Human Rights Dialogue (HRD)
sessions. Ironically, rather than serving to substantially
increase pressure for human rights reforms, the HRD, by
providing a separate forum, has allowed a decoupling of
human rights from other issues, such as trade relations (cf.,
Axyonova, 2011). Regarding Azerbaijan, one commentator
lamented that the EU ‘has been strong on democracy and
human rights rhetoric but woefully weak on substance’
(Boonstra, 2008: 142). Although the EU has been criticized
for not exerting greater pressure, the pressure it has levied
has been disconcerting for the Caspian's authoritarian re-
gimes (cf. e.g., Peyrouse, 2014).
Another issue in the relations between the EU and the
Caspian states is security. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have
links with NATO, but the EU is too ‘far away’ to become a
serious security partner. Nomatter how closely the Caspian
states cooperate with the EU, the EU would not be able to
supply the same intensity of security relations that these
states have e either happily or because circumstances de-
mand e with Russia (cf., Gast, 2014). Some commentators
have even suggested that Kazakhstan cooperates with
NATO as a counterbalance to its involvement in the
Russian-led alliance, CSTO (Marat, 2010: 110; Sharip, 2009).6.2. EU-Azerbaijan energy relations
To promote European commercial investments into
Azerbaijan's energy sector, the EU and Azerbaijan signed a
PCA in 1996. In November 2006, both sides signed a MoU
prioritizing speciﬁc areas of energy cooperation, for
example, encouraging energy efﬁciency and renewable
energies, and also developing transit systems (European
External Action Service, 2014a). This was followed by the16 ‘The EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan’, Europe.eu, 4
March 2009, last accessed 15 July 2014, http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/energy/european_energy_policy/en0003_en.htm.
17 Cf., Karachaganak Petroleum Operating website, last accessed 14 July
2014, http://www.kpo.kz.
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Baku in January 2011, which provides a legal framework for
supplying Azerbaijani gas to Europe, including building
direct delivery routes from Azerbaijan to Europe and
creating the necessary regulations and commercial
conditions.
However, in the area of multilateral cooperation,
Azerbaijan does not see integration with the EU as a main
goal of its foreign strategy and is looking to establish a
strategic partnership primarily in the economic and energy
spheres. For this reason, Baku has not signed the Associa-
tion Agreement within the framework of the EU Eastern
Partnership (Ibrahimov, 2014; Makili-Aliyev, 2013).
Alongside these intergovernmental agreements, Euro-
pean energy companies have been involved since the early
1990s in exploring and producing Azerbaijani oil and gas
ﬁelds and developing new transportation routes. The most
prominent European company and largest foreign investor
in Azerbaijan is BP, which operates the Azerbaijan Inter-
national Operating Company (AIOC), a consortium pro-
ducing 80% of the country's oil (US Energy Information
Agency, 2013a).
Despite the heavy involvement of European companies
in Azerbaijan, the EU has a miserable track record in
securing transit routes for natural gas from the Caspian
region. For example, the proposed 31 bcm/y Nabucco
pipeline project, announced in 2002 by various European
companies, encountered hurdle after hurdle. Part of the
problem was the consortium's inability to secure ﬁrm
commitments of natural gas from Caspian and Middle
Eastern suppliers, a problem exacerbated by the tepid
diplomatic support provided to Nabucco by EU ofﬁcials,
even though the EU had formally designated Nabucco as a
project of common European interest (Kusznir, 2012a;
Nanay& Smith Stegen, 2012; Smith Stegen& Palovic, 2014).
In the midst of Nabucco's troubles, in 2011 the TANAP
project was initiated by Azerbaijan (80% share) and Turkey
(20% share). This pipeline is planned to run from the
Georgian-Turkish border to the Turkish-European border,
where it will branch into two pipelines, one to Greece and
another to Bulgaria. The Nabucco consortium, realizing it
could not compete against TANAP, scaled Nabucco down to
a shorter ‘Nabucco West’, which the consortium hoped
would be selected to connect to TANAP. However, in the
ﬁnal competition, Nabucco West lost out to the Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) (Kusznir, 2015b). TAP will have an
initial capacity of 10 bcm/y, which could be potentially
doubled to 20 bcm/y. These capacity ﬁgures mean that
Europe will receive less gas than it would have through the
Nabucco pipeline. The Nabucco versus TANAP outcome also
means that Azerbaijan has been able to position itself as a
key e if not the key e decision-maker in the EU's Southern
Corridor initiative; a position that Brussels may have
preferred to retain for itself.
6.3. EU-Kazakhstan energy relations
The ﬁrst basic document establishing bilateral cooper-
ation between the EU and Kazakhstan was a PCA, signed in
1995, which set common goals for cooperation, including
for energy, trade and investment. In December 2006, theEuropean Commission and Kazakhstan signed a MoU,
launching two road maps on energy security and industrial
cooperation (European External Action Service, 2014b).
More recently, in October 2014, the EU and Kazakhstan
concluded negotiations on an enhanced PCA, covering 29
cooperation areas. The enhanced PCA does not foresee the
establishment of a free trade area, but it is the ﬁrst of its
kind outside the Eastern Partnership agreements. Agree-
ment on the new PCA was reached a few months after the
establishment of the EEU between Kazakhstan, Belarus and
Russia, which, in the opinion of some experts, shows
Kazakhstan's continued interest in balancing its relations
with Russia (Norling, 2014; Schlager, 2014).
Since the early 1990s, major European energy com-
panies, including Total, Royal Dutch Shell, and the British
BG Group, have developed close cooperation with Kazakh
energy companies on oil and gas projects. These include the
development of Kazakhstan's largest onshore oil ﬁeld,
Karachaganak, which holds around 1.2 billion tonnes of oil
and gas condensates and 1.3 trillion cubic metres of natural
gas (US Energy Information Agency, 2013b), and accounts
for 45% of Kazakhstan's domestic gas production.17 The
European companies Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and Eni, are
shareholders in the North Caspian Operating Company
(NCOC) consortium, which is developing the offshore
Kashagan oil ﬁeld, the world's ﬁfth largest known ﬁeld in
terms of reserves (US Energy Information Agency, 2013b).
Just as Azerbaijan has become more assertive vis-a-vis
its energy relations with western parties, so has
Kazakhstan. In 2007, the Kazakh government promulgated
laws allowing it to ‘break natural resource contracts and
force renegotiation. This puts pressure on projects
involving both IOCs and national oil companies (NOCs) in
new and well-established partnerships: ‘In this investment
model, described by some as “market-friendly resource
nationalism”, the state company renegotiates to become
the dominant partner’ (Garrison & Abdurahmonov, 2011:
395). Kazakhstan used the new legislation to force foreign
companies in the Kashagan consortium to relinquish
shares.
6.4. EU-Turkmenistan energy relations
In May 1998 Turkmenistan signed a PCA with the EU,
which covered political dialogue, trade and economic re-
lations. A few months later, in November 1998, both sides
reached an Interim Trade Agreement. However, no further
signiﬁcant achievements were made and relations stag-
nated. The situation began to change in the mid-2000s
when the EU identiﬁed Turkmenistan as an important
part of its Southern Gas Corridor initiative. Turkmenistan-
EU cooperation was strengthened through a series of
meetings between Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdi-
muhamedov and EU ofﬁcials in Brussels in 2007. Subse-
quently, the EU developed different cooperative
instruments to support reforms in Turkmenistan's eco-
nomic, social and institutional sectors, and a Europa House
19 ‘US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hold hearing on Mor-
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Service, 2014c). However, relations have also been
complicated by Turkmenistan's problematic human rights
record: The EU has placed pressure on Turkmenistan and
the Turkmen regime, in turn, bristles at the criticism. The
development of bilateral relations has been smoothed,
somewhat, with the launching of the EU-Turkmenistan
Human Rights Dialogue (Anceschi, 2010).
For many years, Turkmenistan was leery of allowing
foreign involvement in its energy sector; it was not until
May 2008 that the EU and Turkmenistan signed a MoU to
work together on issues such as technology exchange and
the development of Turkmenistan's oil and gas ﬁelds.
Nevertheless, European energy companies made little
headway in Turkmenistan. The re-launching of the TCP
initiative has meanwhile intensiﬁed the EU's interest in
Turkmenistan. The President of the European Commission,
Jose Manuel Barroso, visited Turkmenistan in January 2011
and Turkmenistan's leader expressed willingness to supply
30 bcm/y to a future TCP; however, among other compli-
cations surrounding the TCP project, Turkmenistan and the
EU have not been able to agree on a pricing arrangement
(Blank, 2013: 18).18 Because of the political situation be-
tween Russia and Ukraine and the uncertainty of future gas
supplies to Europe, in mid-2014, the EU once again
approached Turkmenistan about the TCP. Meanwhile, as
mentioned in the RussiaeTurkmenistan case study,
Turkmenistan has been engaged in trilateral talks with
Azerbaijan and Turkey over the various options for sup-
plying the Southern Gas Corridor (Fitzpatrick, 2014). It is
not clear if the TCP will be among the ‘winners’.
Since the Caspian states gained independence, the EU's
approach towards energy security has steadily evolved. But
there have been challenges: The EU must balance the in-
terests of its individual member states, which often clash
with Brussels's interests, while contending with its own
complex decision-making mechanisms. Consequently, the
EU has been only partially successful in realizing its
Southern Gas Corridor. It managed to obtain 10 bcm from
Azerbaijan (via TANAP-TAP) and has initiated various po-
litical and economic overtures towards Turkmenistan that
have sparked Turkmenistan's interest in greater energy
cooperation. Some observers claim that the energy security
crises of the late 2000s have changed the attitudes of EU
ofﬁcials, who now realize that external pressure on the
political regimes in the Caspian region cannot guarantee
supplies of signiﬁcant volumes of gas. Moreover, EU ofﬁ-
cials have recognized quite late that they have better
chances of succeeding when they consider the national
interests and preferences of local elites (Anceschi, 2010;
Denison, 2009). Even if the EU tones down its political
pressure, it must still confront other issues preventing it
from competing head-to-head with other actors: the EU
can neither offer investments or stimulatory ﬁnancial18 ‘Turkmenistan mulls opportunities of its gas supplies to Europe:
President’, Azernews.az, 18 October 2013, last accessed 12 July 2014,
http://www.azernews.az/region/60791.html; ‘SOCAR: Trans-Caspian gas
pipeline will be a very ambitious project for EU’, Trend.az, 12 February
2013, last accessed 14 July 2014, http://en.trend.az/capital/energy/
2118681.html.mechanisms at the same level as Chinese NOCs nor can it
promote individual European companies. This kind of
support is particularly important for elites from countries
such as Turkmenistan, who are accustomed to dealing with
single state-owned companies, rather than multiple en-
tities (Denison, 2009).7. Case studies: US
7.1. US behaviour and commercial engagement
The involvement of the US in the Caspian dates back to
the early 1990s when US energy companies became inter-
ested in tapping new sources of non-OPEC oil and the US
government realized it could reduce Russian and Iranian
inﬂuence if it supported pipelines bypassing those coun-
tries. The best example is provided by the US government's
intense support for the BTC pipeline. US diplomats have
also actively supported the EU in getting Caspian gas for the
Southern Gas Corridor. In particular, at the end of the
2000s, they intensively encouraged Azerbaijan to promise
gas to the Nabucco pipeline (Nanay & Smith Stegen, 2012);
and, later, backed the TANAP project.19 Despite this interest,
however, the US is the only major external actor without a
‘regularized consultative mechanism’ in the region (Starr,
2014: 6).
In 2011, the US government announced the ‘New Silk
Road’ initiative, which some hope will promote greater
regional economic and transit cooperation between South
and Central Asia and thereby enhance stability in the region
after the drawdown of US and NATO troops from
Afghanistan (US Department of State, 2014; see also Kim &
Indeo, 2013; Rywkin, 2011; Starr, 2011). To realize the New
Silk Road, the US government identiﬁed several high-
priority infrastructure projects, including a rail line from
Afghanistan to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, a regional
electricity network, and the 1735 km long Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which
would bypass Russian territory. According to US ofﬁcials,
the pipeline is particularly important because it would
provide transit revenues for both Afghanistan and Pakistan
and link Afghanistan to global markets (Kim & Indeo, 2013;
Mankoff, 2013). The US government also hopes TAPI will
stop the realization of a rival Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipe-
line (Cabestan, 2011). It should be noted, however, that
some commentators are sceptical of the seriousness of the
New Silk Road initiative, asserting it is merely a re-
packaging of existing projects (Blank, 2013).
For the US government, engagement in the region is
shaped by strategic and political objectives. Similar to the
EU's internal contradictions, the US0 approach is inﬂuencedningstar's candidacy to post of ambassador to Azerbaijan’, Avciya.az, 2012,
last accessed 14 July 2014, http://avciya.az/eng/news/intheworld/2448-
us-senate-committee-on-foreign-relations-hold-hearing-on-morning-
stars-candidacy-to-post-of-ambassador-to-azerbaijan.html; ‘Richard
Morningstar: Would Azerbaijan be able to retain its independence if there
is not a Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan oil pipeline?’, Contact.az, 23 April 2014, last
accessed 21 July 2014, http://www.contact.az/docs/2014/Politics/
042300076452en.htm#.U80ERLF3t8E.
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fears that civil crises in the region would create power
vacuums that could be ﬁlled by extremist Islamic groups
and thus provides support to the region's authoritarian
regimes (_Ipek, 2007b; see also Raphael & Stokes, 2014).
Some voices within the US, however, assert that the US has
been too focused on security relations at the expense of
pushing for human rights reforms (_Ipek, 2007b; Nichol,
2014). The US government has, at times, pressed for polit-
ical reform and democratization e for example, in
Turkmenistan and in Kazakhstan e to the extent that it has
reportedly unnerved regional elites: ‘Washington has come
to be viewed as the greater threat to the region's non-
democratic ruling elites, who fear that they are targets for
ouster’ (Olcott, 2005: 331; see also Hu & Cheng, 2008). In
other words, the US is torn between pushing for liber-
alization and other democratic reforms while simulta-
neously supplying the very same regimes with security
assistance to help stabilize them as well as help them
protect their energy assets from disruptions, such as
terrorist attacks (for more on US security assistance, see
Raphael & Stokes, 2014).
Turning to more purely commercial engagement in the
region, US companies have often been at the forefront of
energy deals and consortia in the region, which will be
covered in the next sections.
7.2. US-Azerbaijan energy relations
As mentioned earlier, the US government has lobbied
Azerbaijan to commit oil and gas to western markets and
US companies have also been active. For example, Exxon-
Mobil and Chevron hold stakes in the AIOC. Moreover,
these two companies are signiﬁcant investors in infra-
structure projects, including the South Caucasus Pipeline (a
gas pipelines from Baku via Tbilisi to the Turkish town of
Erzurum) and the BTC oil pipeline. They are also involved in
developing the Trans-Caspian Oil Transport System be-
tween Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The economic engage-
ment of the US in Azerbaijan is, however, complicated by
organized Armenian interests in the US e the ‘Armenian
lobby’ ewhich has often succeeded in blocking US support
initiatives for Azerbaijan. Ofﬁcially, US aid to Azerbaijan is
even banned, per Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act,
which was put into force in October 1992 during the
Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict. The section has been sus-
pended by every US president since 2002; however, so long
as the restriction remains, it symbolically and materially
punishes Azerbaijan and makes it vulnerable to aid cut-
offs.20
7.3. US-Kazakhstan energy relations
The involvement of US oil companies in Kazakhstan
dates back to Soviet times, when Chevron was invited to
help develop difﬁcult ﬁelds. Chevron is still a signiﬁcant20 ‘Section 907 loses relevance to Azerbaijan, top ofﬁcial says’, Trend.az,
5 May 2012, last accessed 21 July 2014, http://en.trend.az/news/politics/
2022586.html.presence in Kazakhstan, holding a 50% stake in Tengiz-
chevroil (which operates the large Tengiz oil ﬁeld), and a
15% stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) (US
Energy Information Agency, 2013b). ExxonMobil and Con-
ocoPhillips have both been members of the NCOC con-
sortium, which is developing the offshore Kashagan oil
ﬁeld. When Kazakhstan changed its laws in 2007, allowing
it to renegotiate contracts, both companies had to give up
shares (Daly, 2014). In July 2013, ConocoPhillips sold the
remainder of its shares to the Kazakh government,
reportedly because of the high costs and long delays
associated with the project (Helman, 2012). Of note is that,
in September 2013, these shares were acquired by the
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).217.4. US-Turkmenistan energy relations
Because of its problematic human rights record, the US
initially took a hard-line against Turkmenistan. The US did
not initially recognize Turkmenistan's independence and,
in September 1993, cut off trade credits to protest the ar-
rests of four human rights activists. The US approach soft-
ened, however, as US strategic and economic interests
became more apparent: On the one hand, Turkmenistan
could play an important role in reducing Europe's reliance
on Russian natural gas and, on the other hand, the US
feared that Turkmenistan could become a signiﬁcant en-
ergy partner for Iran. Thus, in 1993, the US allowed
Turkmenistan to secure most-favoured-nation trading
status (International Business Publications, 2009: 223).
However, the US returned to its hard-line stance in 2002,
when human rights problems again came to the fore
(Decaux, 2003; US Department of State, 2003).
Despite these intergovernmental tensions, both
Chevron and ExxonMobil have expressed interest in
Turkmenistan (Bhutta, 2013). However, US companies face
two obstacles. First, US government concerns about ‘dem-
ocratic accountability places constraints on the depth of the
private-public sector relationship’ (O'Neill, 2014: 3). In
other words, the US government is reticent about sup-
porting US commerce in Turkmenistan, which makes it
difﬁcult for US companies to compete against companies
with strong state backing, such as their Chinese NOC rivals.
Second, Turkmenistan's extant long-term gas contracts
with Russia and China cover all its currently available gas.
In sum, all of themajor actors covered heree Russia, the
EU and the US e are interested in participating in Caspian
upstream projects and in inﬂuencing, if not controlling, the
routes of export pipelines. They have all also pursued po-
litical objectives that regional leaders, for the most part,
ﬁnd objectionable. Russia seeks ‘re-integration’, and the EU
and US press for political reform. Meanwhile, Russia and
the US both seek to minimize each other's inﬂuence. For
Caspian leaders, China's commercial interest, combined21 ‘China buys into giant Kazakh oilﬁeld for $5 billion’, Reuters, 7




22 Cf., CNPC website, last accessed 21 July 2014, http://classic.cnpc.com.
cn/en/cnpcworldwide/azerbaijan/?COLLCC¼2792998382&.
23 ‘V RK 22 neftyanye kompanii s kitaiiskim uchastiem’, Forbes.kz,12
January 2013, last accessed 14 July 2014, http://forbes.kz/process/
probing/v_rk_rabotayut_22_neftyanyie_kompanii_s_kitayskim_
uchastiem.
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alternative and a counterweight.
8. Case studies: China
8.1. Why does China look to Caspian producers?
For many years, China was energy self-sufﬁcient; how-
ever, as its economy has grown, so has its demand for en-
ergy. In 1993, oil demand outstripped domestic supply and
China became a net oil importer; in 2006, it became a net
gas importer. Within less than two decades, China became
the world's largest energy consumer and by 2012 had to
import 57% of its oil. If current trends continue, by 2020 it
will rely on imports for 66% of its oil supply. Chinese ofﬁ-
cials have become increasingly worried about energy se-
curity and have undertaken numerous strategies.
Domestically, the government encourages greater oil and
gas exploration and production, energy conservation, and
the promotion of renewable energies, among other mea-
sures. Internationally, ofﬁcials focus on securing energy
supply chains and transportation routes (Smith Stegen,
2015).
Signiﬁcant portions of China's oil and LNG imports from
the Middle East and Africa pass through the Strait of
Malacca, where the US Navy controls regional Sea Lines of
Communication. Consequently, Chinese ofﬁcials fear that
the US could halt oil and LNG shipments in the case of a
conﬂict between China and a US ally in the Paciﬁc. Conse-
quently, the Strait of Malacca has become a strategic
weakness for China. To cope with the ‘Malacca dilemma’,
China is enhancing its blue-water naval capabilities, but has
also focused on constructing overland pipelines, for
example, in Myanmar, Pakistan, and Iran (Blumenthal,
2008; Chen, 2010; Smith, 2014). To further secure over-
land supplies, China has also intensiﬁed its involvement in
the Caspian region (Smith Stegen, 2015).
Overlapping its country-speciﬁc commercial in-
vestments, China, similar to Russia, has sought to develop
multilateral institutions, such as the SCO, which originated
in 1996 in cooperation agreements between China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. According to
several analysts, the SCO helped China reduce the inﬂuence
of its perceived rivals (e.g., the US and India) in the region
and re-deﬁne existing geopolitical alliances in its favour
(Marketos, 2009a: 11; Cabestan, 2013). During Xi Jinping's
‘victory lap’ visit to Astana in September 2013, an initiative
even more ambitious than the SCO was announced: the
launching of a new ‘Silk Road’ economic belt, which would
connect eastern, western and southern Asia (Szczudlik-
Tatar, 2013). The ‘Silk Road’ plan would be more compre-
hensive ‘than either Russia's “Eurasian Union” or the United
States' “New Silk Road” projects. [… ] Energy resources will
ﬂow from the west and goods will ﬂow both eastwards and
westwards, with China as the central hub’ (Smith Stegen,
2015).
8.2. ChinaeAzerbaijan energy relations
When China and Azerbaijan established diplomatic re-
lations in 1992, trade turnover between the two countriesamounted to only US$1.5 million. By 2013, the volume of
trade had increased several hundred-fold to US$1.2 billion.
The main areas of investment are construction, communi-
cations and agriculture. China has also intensiﬁed energy
cooperation with Azerbaijan, although the level of activity
is relatively modest in comparison to its engagements in
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Since 2002, CNPC has
entered into several production sharing contracts and has
developed and operated Azerbaijani oil ﬁelds as well as
provided technical support and services.22 However, China
was rather late in approaching Azerbaijan and most of the
major deals have already been sealed. Nonetheless, China is
highly interested in making inroads into the Azeri energy
sector (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce, 2014). China
may yet play a larger role if new ﬁelds are found or if
partners depart from consortia and new investors are
needed. At the moment, however, most of China's energy
activities are in the East Caspian states.8.3. ChinaeKazakhstan energy relations
Over the last two decades, ChineseeKazakh relations
have developed according to a comprehensive bilateral
strategic partnership based on a contractual framework
covering numerous agreements and documents. China is
Kazakhstan's leading economic and trade partner and,
Kazakhstan, among the post-Soviet states, is China's largest
trading partner. The volume of mutual trade in 2013
reached US$22.5 billion. In 2013, exports from Kazakhstan
to China were worth US$14.3 billion, while imports from
China amounted to US$8.2 billion (Delegation der
deutschen Wirtschaft für Zentralasien, 2014). The main
exports to China are natural resources, including crude oil,
natural gas, copper and other metals.
At least 22 energy companies with Chinese participation
are active in Kazakhstan's oil sector; ten of them are wholly
or almost entirely controlled by Chinese investors. The
share of Chinese companies in the Kazakh oil industry is
expected to soon exceed 40%.23 The most prominent
participant is CNPC, which has acquired stakes in Kazakh
energy companies and is involved in various upstream and
infrastructure development projects. For example, it owns
60% of Kazakhstan's Aktobe Oil and Gas Corporation, a
subsidiary of the national energy company KazMunaiGaz
(KMG). Together with KMG, CNPC constructed the
KazakhstaneChina oil pipeline, with a capacity of 12.5
million tonnes per year. The two companies are also con-
structing the KazakhstaneChina gas pipeline, which will
eventually link up to the Central AsiaeChina pipeline
network.
During Xi Jinping's ‘victory lap’ tour in September 2013,
Kazakhstan and China signed over twenty energy deals
worth US$30 billion and CNPC acquired an 8.33% stake in
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belonging to ConocoPhillips).24 It is China's ﬁrst offshore
and largest acquisition in the Caspian Sea basin and will
help China ﬁll the KazakhstaneChina oil pipeline.
China has rapidly become amajor player in Kazakhstan,
perhaps too quickly and too prominently for many Ka-
zakhs. Just as Kazakhstan (and other Caspian states) have
become more assertive with its western partners,
Kazakhstan has also asserted itself against China. For
example, in 2005, the Kazakh government pressured CNPC
to overpay for Petrokaz and then later sell a third of the
shares, at a loss, to Kazakhstan's KMG (Garrison &
Abdurahmonov, 2011; Liao, 2006). There has also been
backlash in Kazakhstan against China's engagement:
When China wanted to rent signiﬁcant tracts of agricul-
tural land in Kazakhstan in the late 2000s, demonstrations
were organized against ‘Chinese expansionism’ (Roberts,
2010). And, voices critical of burgeoning Chinese inﬂu-
ence were particularly present after the ratiﬁcation of the
bilateral agreements on energy cooperation between
Kazakhstan and China in September 2013. Kazakhstan's
First Deputy Prime Minister Bakytzhan Sagintayev
reportedly stated that he ‘did not want to see any single
country controllingmore than 30% of its [Kazakhstan's, the
authors] oil and gas production.’ According to Sagintayev:
‘Our priority is protecting our national interests. We will
not allow the expansion of not only China, but also any
other country in the energy sector’.25
8.4. ChinaeTurkmenistan energy relations
China has also successfully acquired signiﬁcant energy
stakes in Turkmenistan. In 2007, Ashgabat and Beijing
began constructing the 1833 km long Central AsiaeChina
gas pipeline, connecting Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan with Xinjiang (US Energy Information Agency,
2012). In 2012, Turkmenistan exported 21.3 bcm of gas
via the pipeline to China (BP, 2014), about half of the
country's total gas exports and about half of China's total
imports. In September 2013, China and Turkmenistan
decided to expand the Central AsiaeChina pipeline's ca-
pacity to 65 bcm/y by 2020. For Turkmenistan, gas exports
to Chinese energy markets reduce its dependence on
Russia, increase export revenues, and promote economic
growth. Moreover, at the moment, CNPC is the only foreign
company involved in the development of Turkmenistan's
onshore gas ﬁelds. In 2012, China became Turkmenistan's
leading trade partner, a position that was further secured
with the massive agreements signed during China's 2013
‘victory lap’ visit.
With regards to multilateral institutions: Turkmeni-
stan's president has attended meetings of the heads of SCO
member states and has spoken regularly about the24 ‘China buys into giant Kazakh oilﬁeld for $5 billion’, Reuters, 7




25 ‘Kazakhstan may restrict foreign involvement in oil and gas sector’,
Newsbase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, 21 May 2014.prospects and signiﬁcance of the SCO for cooperation in the
energy and transportations sectors. However,
Turkmenistan is neither an SCOmember nor observer state
and, just as Turkmenistan is reluctant to join Russian in-
stitutions, it has no plans to join the SCO.26
In sum, several factors can explain China's success in
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. First, China can offer
ﬁnancial support and massive investment packages on a
scale unfeasible for western companies (O'Neill, 2014) or
for Russian entities. Second, some analysts maintain that
China's success stems from its non-interference policy in
internal matters and its acceptance of existing informal
rules (Blank, 2012; Cabestan, 2011;Weitz, 2008). According
to Olcott (2013: 1), ‘what Central Asian leaders ﬁnd most
appealing about this approach is [… ] Beijing's strategy of
developing investment projects that both sides ﬁnd genu-
inely beneﬁcial, and avoiding all discussions of domestic
political affairs.’9. Discussion and conclusion
Which state has ‘won’ the energy component of the
Caspian's ‘New Great Game’?
We argue that the winners are China as well as the
Caspian states themselves. In terms of the major external
powers, China has billions of dollars to invest and these
investments, for the most part, have beenwelcomed by the
Caspian states. China is now the main trading partner of
both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan has also
been receptive to Chinese investment and Chinese com-
panies could gain a strong foothold in exploration and
production. As several experts of the region have noted,
China has taken the lead (Boonstra& Laruelle, 2013; Olcott,
2013; Gente, 2014; Standish, 2014). Which factors pro-
duced this ‘dark horse winner’ outcome? We argue that
some of the behaviour of the major external actors in the
region provided incentives for the Caspian states to look for
alternative partners; and, we argue that US naval domi-
nance in the Strait of Malacca reinforced China's search for
new sources of energy.
Russia has been heavy-handed with regards to its inte-
gration efforts and its desire for control over energy infra-
structure and routes, all of which have irritated Caspian
rulers. Even Kazakhstan, which seems closest to Russia, has
made sure to sign equivalent agreements with theWest, for
example, signing the enhanced PCA with the EU on the
heels of joining Russia's EEU. Although the US and the EU
may not have emphasized political reform, human rights
and democratization as much as the NGO community
would have liked them to, both have nonetheless exerted
some pressure, which has consternated Caspian authori-
tarian rulers. China, which emphasizes that its aid and in-
vestments are not tied to political reform, has appeared as a
very welcome alternative. Meanwhile, China's willingness
to invest signiﬁcant sums in the Caspian region is related
partly to its rapidly increasing demand for energy and26 ‘Permanent Neutrality Turkmenistan: Cooperation for peace, security
and progress’, Turkmenistan.ru, 14 December 2010, last accessed 14July
2014, http://www.turkmenistan.ru/en/articles/14412.html.s.
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Malacca. The military activities of the US play an important
role in the Caspian dynamics, a factor which we believe has
been overlooked in most accounts of the Caspian's ‘New
Great Game’.
An additional contribution of our article is our side-by-
side presentation of the energy relations in the Caspian
region, between each of the major external actors e Russia,
the US, the EU, and China e and the energy-producing
Caspian states e Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan. Our account indicates that, during the past
decade, the Caspian states have become very assertive in
gaining control over their energy assets and over trans-
portation routes. The Caspian states have become autono-
mous actors. We argue that this assertive behaviour does
not fall under the category of multi-vectorism; in other
words, some of the behaviours related in the case studies
do not constitute neutrality, balancing, counterbalancing,
or any of the other descriptions of multi-vectorism. Let us
consider various demonstrations of assertiveness by the
Caspian states.
In 2007, the Kazakhstan government passed legislation
that enabled it to cancel and renegotiate contracts with
foreign partners, which it then proceeded to do e to the
disgruntlement of IOCs and NOCs alike. In 2007, for
example, Kazakhstan forced western stakeholders in the
Kashagan consortium to turn over shares to KMG. It also
forced China's CNPC to overpay for PetroKaz and then later
forced CNPC to sell a third of the shares to state-owned
KMG at a signiﬁcant loss. As one analyst observed,
‘Kazakhstan has shown a willingness to play rough with
both Western and Chinese companies’ (Kennedy, 2010:
132).
Azerbaijan was quite assertive vis-a-vis the EU's
Southern Gas Corridor: it launched a competing pipeline to
the EU's pipeline, Nabucco, which ultimately led to the
demise of Nabucco and to Azerbaijan taking a leading po-
sition in the EU's Southern Gas Corridor initiative.
Last but not least, Turkmenistan demonstrated its
assertiveness with its rejection of Russia's Prikaspiysky
pipeline routing and with the implementation of its own
pipeline project. In 2014, Turkmenistan became involved in
trilateral talks with Turkey and Azerbaijan over the
Southern Corridor and it appears that Turkmenistan may
prioritize supplying TANAP over the TCP, which could be a
contributing factor to the TCP once again stalling.
The common denominator of these various acts of
assertiveness is that they allow the Caspian states e that is,
their authoritarian rulers e to maximize the revenues they
can receive from their hydrocarbon assets. They also
demonstrate that the Caspian states are conﬁdent enough
of their own clout and autonomy that they are unafraid of
offending or aggravating their larger and, from a military
perspective, more powerful neighbours. Indeed, autonomy
e particularly control over their economic destiny, which
they derive from their hydrocarbon resources e seems to
be at the heart of the matter for the Caspian states. We aver
that, since about 2007, Caspian state behaviour no longer
strictly resembles multi-vectorism. In short: in terms of
energy relations, multi-vectorism, as it was practiced
earlier, is over.What has brought about this change? A theoretical
analysis is beyond the scope (and word limit) of this special
issue. We suggest, however, several ways of viewing the
new behaviour. First, after independence, the Caspian
states were poor. As Hill (2003: 244e245) posits, states
with low per capita gross domestic product (GDP) per year
‘lack the resources to be pro-active in international affairs [
… ] they also ﬁnd it difﬁcult to protect themselves from
external interference. Their foreign policy is dominated by
the need for economic development and ﬁnancial assis-
tance. Diplomacy in these circumstances is successful if it
can widen the negotiating margin of manoeuvre of a sup-
plicant even a little’. This description, in many ways, cap-
tures aptly the Caspian states in the 1990s and the early
2000s. Multi-vectorism is the form of ‘diplomacy’ these
states have deployed to widen the margin of manoeu-
vrability. The annual GDPs of all three states, however, have
risen dramatically in the past decade or so (International
Monetary Fund, 2014). These states are no longer poor
and have become less dependent; thus, they no longer
need to follow the foreign policy approaches of poor states.
An additional way of viewing the change in Caspian
state behaviour is to focus on the authoritarian elites who
run these countries: according to an array of scholars, these
rulers need to maximize rents in order to perpetuate their
regimes and systems of patronage (cf. e.g., Denison, 2012;
Franke, Gawrich, & Alakbarov, 2009; Kusznir, 2012b;
Meissner, 2010). Although we do not conduct such an
analysis ourselves, we acknowledge that the rulers of these
countries are seeking to prop up their regimes and feather
their nests, as quickly and as richly as possible. This is
particularly true of Azerbaijan, where the oil reserves are
only expected to last another twenty years (Guliyev, 2015;
Lücke, 2010). Most likely, the shift away from multi-
vectorism in energy matters is a combination of the two
factors: the authoritarian rulers across the region need
ever-greater revenue streams and are better able to assert
control as their countries’ economic performances have
improved.
What could the shift away from a multi-vector
approach, in energy matters, portend for the future? We
are aware that energy was only one component of each
state's overarching multi-vector approach. However, the
energy component is, in many ways, the most powerful
‘leveraging’ tool the Caspian states have at their disposal. If
our argument is correct e that energy relations no longer
follow the logic of multi-vectorism e then this will even-
tually have implications for the overall strategies and
foreign policies of these states. In other words, changes in
how they conduct their energy relations may be a
harbinger of other changes. These countries' quest for au-
tonomy will surely not be restricted to the energy domain.References
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